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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction in this Court arises under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78A-3-102(3)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee Salt Lake County ("County") objects to the Statement of Issues offered by
Defendant/Appellant Antony Davis ("Davis"). See Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-4. The County
sets forth the following statement of the sole issue before this court:
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant had failed to
demonstrate a "compelling reason" for the court to require payment of defense
resources for Defendant by the County outside the County's contract for legal
defense services.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of discretion. See generally, State v. Levin,
2006 UT 50, t 24, 144 P.3d 1096 ("Discretion is broadest - and the standard
of review is most deferential - when the application of a legal concept is
highly fact dependant and variable.")1.
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE

See discussion of "compelling reason" issue, in County's Opposition Memorandum
to Defendant's Motion (R. 51-83); and in the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law(R. 104-106).

The County finds no Utah case authority on the standard of appellate review in the
context of a claim for indigent defense funds where the "compelling reason" standard is at
issue. However the discussion in State v. Levin provides an analogous context.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann., Sec. 77-32-101, et. seq..
United States Constitution, Amend. V, VI and IVX

PAGE 2 OF 22

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below

NATURE OF THE CASE:
In the underlying criminal action, defendant/appellant Antony Davis ("Davis") filed a
motion asking the trial court to order Salt Lake County, in effect, to pay for Davis'
anticipated expert witnesses, and private investigator(s) because Davis is indigent and needs
the experts and investigator to mount an effective defense. Davis' motion was fully briefed,
and after a hearing on August 18, 2009, the trial court found that Davis was indigent, but
that he failed to demonstrate a "compelling reason" why the court should require the County
to pay for noncontracting defense resources as required by several sections of the Utah
Indigent Defense Act. Thus, the court denied Defendant's motion.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW:
Following the trial court's denial of his motion, Davis sought and was granted leave
by this court to file this interlocutory appeal on November 23, 2009 (R. 146). On July 22,
2010, Salt Lake County moved to intervene as the real party in interest in lieu of the State of
Utah as the nominal plaintiff because the County has the sole potential liability to pay for
the defense resources requested by Davis. The County's intervention was allowed, and
upon motion of the County, this appeal was consolidated on August 10, 2010 with two
other pending interlocutory appeals raising similar issues under the Indigent Defense Act,
to-wit: State v. Randy Jeffs, No. 20090737-SC, and State v. Branson Parduhn, No.
20090744-SC.
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2.

Statement of Facts

1.

Davis was charged by information filed January 22, 2009 with Rape of a Child

and Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child (each a first degree felony). [See Court Docket; R.
1-3].
2.

On January 27, 2009, at Davis' initial appearance, the Court found Davis

indigent and appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association ("LDA") to represent
Davis. [Docket; R. 13-14].
3.

On May 11, 2009, private attorney Sean Druyon filed a substitution as counsel

for Davis. [Docket; R. 31-32].
4.

On May 18, 2009, LDA filed a motion to withdraw as Davis' counsel.

[Docket; R. 37].
5.

On May 20, 2009, the trial court entered an order allowing LDA to withdraw.

[Docket; R. 38].
6.

On June 18, 2009, Mr. Druyon filed a "Motion for Funds" requesting "funds

to pay for experts and investigators necessary to adequately prepare for trial." ("Defendant's
Motion") [Docket; R. 40-50].
7.

On June 19, 2009, the County filed its Opposition Memorandum regarding

Defendant's Motion. [Docket; R. 51-83].
8.

On August 13, 2009, Davis filed a Reply Memorandum supporting

Defendant's Motion. [Docket; R. 85-89].
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9.

On August 18, 2009, the court conducted a hearing on Defendant's Motion.

The court entered minutes denying Defendant's motion on the ground that there were no
compelling reasons to authorize appointment of noncontracting defense resources. [Docket;
R. 90-91].
10.

On September 10, 2009, Defendant objected to the "State's" proposed

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. [R. 96-103].
11.

On September 11, 2009, the court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order denying Defendant's Motion [R. 104-106].
12.

On September 22, 2009, the trial court entered a minute entry denying

Defendant's objection to the County's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, finding that the County proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
reflected the court's findings and rulings more accurately than did those submitted by the
Defendant. [R. 143].
13.

On September 30, 2009, Defendant filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal.

[R. 146].
14.

On November 23, 2009, the Utah Supreme Court granted Defendant's Petition

for Interlocutory Appeal. [R. 149].
15.

Salt Lake County, pursuant to its statutory responsibility to provide for the

legal defense of indigents, including defense resources and counsel, has contracted with the
LDA. Under the terms of the LDA Agreement for Services (the "LDA Agreement" [q.v., R.
65-83]), which was in effect at all times relevant to this matter, the LDA has the

P A r . F ^ OF 9 ?

responsibility to provide legal representation and counsel, and to contract with investigators
and other resources necessary for a complete defense, according to the standards set forth in
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-32-301 [id., f2.A. (R. 67-68)]. The LDA Agreement provides
that LDA is paid a sum inclusive of all "professional fees and expenses that may be incurred
by [LDA]" in performing its services [id., ^ 1. B. (R. 67)]. The LDA is a well qualified firm
that has provided quality legal services to indigent defendants for many years.
SUMMARY OF THE COUNTY'S ARGUMENT
In accordance with the Utah Indigent Defense Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann.,
Section 77-32-101, et. seq., Salt Lake County contracts with the Salt Lake Legal Defenders
Association ("LDA") to provide for the legal defense of indigent defendants, including
defense resources2 and counsel. Accordingly, under Section 77-32-306(4) of the Act, LDA
is the "exclusive source" from which indigent legal defense, including indigent defense
resources, may be provided in this case, unless the Court finds a "compelling reason" to
authorize or designate a noncontracting attorney or defense resource for the indigent
defendant.
Assuming that the Defendant is indigent under the procedures and criteria set forth
in Section 77-32-202 of the Act, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
there is no "compelling reason" which would justify the Court to authorize or designate a

2

The Act defines a "defense resource" as: "a competent investigator, expert witness, or
other appropriate means necessary for an effective defense of an indigent, but does not
include legal counsel." Utah Code Ann., Section 77-32-201 (3).
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non-contracting attorney or defense resource for the defense in this case, pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 77-32-302(2)(b) and (e), 77-32-303 and 77-32-306(4) of the Act.
Further, Defendant's reliance on the case of State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795, 2000 UT 56
(Utah 2000) is misplaced, because in 2001 the Utah Legislature, seeking expressly to
overturn the decision in Burns, enacted revisions to the Indigent Defense Act, which
revisions now prohibit the court from appointing a noncontracting defense resource, either
under the Act or under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, unless the court:
(1) conducts a hearing with proper notice, and (2) makes a finding that there is a
"compelling reason" to authorize or designate a noncontracting defense resource for the
indigent defendant. Utah Code Ann., Section 77-32-303.
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ARGUMENT
I
THE LDA IS THE "EXCLUSIVE SOURCE" FROM WHICH THE
INDIGENT LEGAL DEFENSE, INCLUDING DEFENSE
RESOURCES, MAY BE PROVIDED, UNLESS THE COURT,
AFTER PROPER NOTICE AND HEARING, FINDS A
"COMPELLING REASON" FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A
NONCONTRACTING ATTORNEY OR DEFENSE RESOURCE
The Act provides a comprehensive scheme governing not only the procedures and
standards for the determination of the indigence of a criminal defendant, but also the
procedures and standards for the Court to appoint counsel and provide for indigent defense
resources.
Section 77-32-302(2)(b) of the Act establishes the following rule:
"If the county or municipality responsible to provide for the legal defense of
an indigent, including defense resources and counsel, has arranged by contract
to provide those services through a legal aid association, and the court has
received notice or a copy of the contract, the court shall assign the legal aid
association named in the contract to defend the indigent and provide defense
resources." (Emphasis added).
Although this appointment to defend and "provide defense resources" appears to be
mandatory, there is a limited exception to the rule set forth in Section 77-32-302(2)(e):
"If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting attorney or defense
resource to provide legal services to an indigent defendant despite the
existence of an indigent legal services contract and the court has a copy or
notice of the contract, before the court may make the assignment, it shall:
(I) set the matter for a hearing;
(ii) give proper notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible
county or municipality; and
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a
noncontracting attorney or defense resource." (Emphasis added).
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The Act then goes to make it clear that
"[t]he indigent's preference for other counsel or defense resources may not be
considered a compelling reason justifying the appointment of a noncontracting
attorney or defense resource." (Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-32-302(2)(f). The Act, at Section 77-32-201(2), defines the
phrase "compelling reason" as follows:
"'Compelling reason' may include the following circumstances:
(a)
(b)
(c)

a conflict of interest;
the contracting attorney does not have sufficient expertise to provide an
effective defense of the indigent; or
the defense resources is insufficient or lacs expertise to provide a
complete defense."

The Act again clarifies the procedure and standard for appointment of a
"noncontracting" counsel or defense resource in Section 77-32-303:
"If a county or municipality has contracted for, or otherwise made
arrangements for, the legal defense of indigents, ... the court may not
appointment a noncontracting attorney or resource either under this part.
Section 78B-1-15L or Rule 15, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, ... unless
the court:
(1)

(2)

conducts a hearing with proper notice to the responsible entity to
consider the authorization or designation of a noncontract attorney or
resource; and
makes a finding that there is a compelling reason to authorize or
designate a noncontracting attorney or resource for the indigent
defendant." (Emphasis added).

Thus, Section 77-32-303 makes specific reference to Rule 15, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure (expert witnesses) and Section 78B-1-151 (expenses for expert witnesses) and
makes both provisions subject to the "compelling reason" standard.

D A T . C Q r\c
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Once again, in Section 77-32-306(4), the Act specifies the procedure and standard for
appointment of noncontracting counsel or resources:
"When a county or municipality has ... created a legal defender's office as
provided [herein] to provide the legal counsel and defense resources required
by this chapter, the contracted legal aid association or attorneys ... and the
county legal defender's office are the exclusive source from which the legal
defense may be provides, unless the court finds a compelling reason for the
appointment of noncontracting attorneys and defense resources, in which case
the judge shall state the compelling reason on the record." (Emphasis added).
II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO "COMPELLING
REASON" WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY AUTHORIZING OR
DESIGNATING A NONCONTRACTING ATTORNEY OR
DEFENSE RESOURCE
In order for a trial court to go outside of the LDA contract to authorize and designate
a noncontracting defense resource in this case, the defense must provide a "compelling
reason" sufficient to allow the Court to make findings on the record. The Defendant's
Motion failed to demonstrate any "compelling reason" for the court to stray from the
County's contract with LDA. The three circumstances set forth in Section 77-32-201(2),
defining a "compelling reason," while not exclusive3, each clearly do not apply here.
This section provides that "'Compelling reason' may include the following circumstances:
(a) a conflict of interest; (b) the contracting attorney does not have sufficient expertise to
provide an effective defense of the indigent; or (c) the defense resources is insufficient or
lacks expertise to provide a complete defense." (Emphasis added). Thus, a "compelling
reason" is not necessarily limited to the three circumstances described in the Act. However,
the general term "compelling reason" must have some relationship to the three illustrative
circumstances provided by the Act. Under the legal doctrine of ejusdem generis, "in order
to give meaning to the general term, the general term is understood as restricted to include
things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless
there is something to show a contrary intent." See, e.g., Gardiner v. York, 2010 UT App 108,
P A G F 10 OF ??

A. Conflict of Interest. In applying these enumerated statutory circumstances to the
present case, Defendant has not alleged that the LDA has a conflict of interest. Even if the
LDA did have a conflict, it should be noted that the LDA Agreement provides that it is the
responsibility of the LDA to hire and pay for conflict counsel and defense resources in cases
where the LDA has a conflict of interest which would prevent the LDA from representing a
defendant. Accordingly, a conflict of interest is not a "compelling reason" in this case which
would justify going outside of the contract.
B.

Insufficient Expertise of Contracting Attorney. With regard to the second

circumstance relating to insufficient expertise of the contracting attorney, there is no
allegation that the LDA does not have sufficient expertise to provide an effective defense in
this case. Defendant has retained his own private counsel based upon his own choice and
personal preference, but has not alleged that the LDA lacks sufficient expertise to provide an
effective defense of the Defendant.
C. Insufficient Defense Resource. With regard to the third circumstance relating to
the insufficiency of the defense resource or the defense resource's lack of expertise to
provide a complete defense, there should be little question that the LDA is well qualified to
provide quality legal defense resources to indigent defendants and has the resources and

TJ18,233 P.3d 500, 508-509 (citations omitted). Thus, although a "compelling reason" is not
limited solely to the three enumerated circumstances, it should be read to only include other
circumstances "of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated"
in the statutory illustrations.
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expertise to contract with qualified investigators, forensic professionals and other expert
witnesses and resources necessary for a complete defense.
Salt Lake County currently expends approximately $11,000,000.00 yearly (see R. 6583) for defense counsel and defense resources provided through the LDA. Additional
expenditures for "compelling reasons" are rarely warranted when these resources are already
available through the publicly-funded LDA. In other words, because the County has already
paid the LDA under the LDA Agreement to provide all required legal services and resources
for indigent defense, any order requiring payment to private counsel for defense resources
outside of the contract results in the County paying twice for the same thing. With that in
mind, the Act repeatedly requires that a court only depart from using LDA as the "exclusive
source" for defense counsel and resources in the most exceptional circumstances.
Here, Davis has made no argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to find a "compelling reason" to go outside the LDA Agreement to authorize
special defense resources. Instead, Davis simply argues - absent any supporting authority that he has a right to the defense counsel of his choice and, therefore, the Act's "compelling
reason" standard is irrelevant.
Ill
DEFENDANT'S RELIANCE ON THE BURNS CASE IS MISPLACED IN LIGHT
OF SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO THE INDIGENT DEFENSE
ACT
Davis argues that State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795, 2000 UT 56, a case decided in 2000
under the 1997 version of the Indigent Defense Act, rather than the current version
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applicable in this case, and is of questionable validity under the current Act as amended by
the Utah Legislature in 2001 and 2006 directly in response to the Burns decision, applies
notwithstanding the subsequent legislative revisions.
In Burns, the defendant's father paid for a private attorney but could not afford a
expert medical witness. The private attorney petitioned the trial court to appoint publiclyfunded expert witnesses. The court did not address the defendant's indigence, but denied
the requested expert assistance, stating its policy that defendants can only receive statefunded expert assistance if they were represented by LDA counsel. Id., 2000 UT 56 at ^[7,
8. On appeal, the defendant argued that in requiring her to utilize an LDA attorney or forfeit
her right to indigent defense benefits such as expert witness fees, the trial court denied her
federal and state constitutional rights, and violated the Act. Id., If 13.
This court held that "the only requirements for receiving public assistance for expert
witnesses are proof of necessity and establishment of indigence." Id., ^[32. "[Defendant]
was entitled to a hearing for a determination of whether she was indigent without the
condition that she accept LDA counsel" (id.) and "was entitled to a hearing for a
determination of whether she was indigent regardless of who was paying her attorney fees"
(id., T[38). The court also concluded that Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not require a defendant to be represented by LDA in order to qualify for
expert assistance. Id., ^31.
The Utah Legislature sought to overturn Burns by enacting Senate Bill 154 in 2001.
SB 154 revised the standards of the Act to require that a court not appoint a noncontracting

defense resource unless the court first conducts a hearing and makes a finding that there is a
"compelling reason" to authorize or designate a noncontracting defense resource for the
indigent defendant. In amending the Act, the Utah Senate and House of Representatives
recognized a policy of limiting the fees a County should pay while still providing indigent
defendants with "good, qualified experts."4 The 1997 version of the Act, in effect when the
Burns case was decided, only required the Court to "make findings that there is a
compelling reason to appoint a noncontracting attorney," but made no mention of "defense
resources." This prior language was the law under which the Utah Supreme Court made its
Burns ruling.
With SB 154, the Legislature amended the Act in 2001 to include "or defense
resource," which now provides as follows:
"If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting attorney or defense
resource to provide legal services to an indigent defendant despite the
existence of an indigent legal services contract and the court has a copy or
notice of the contract, before the court may make the assignment it shall . . .
make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a noncontracting
attorney or defense resource." See, § 77-32-302(2)(e) (additional language
underlined).5

See, e.g., Senate Floor Debate Audio Recording for Senate Bill 154 on 2/12/2001 and
2/13/2001 and House Floor Debate Audio Recording for Senate Bill 154 on 2/26/2001.
Available at:
http://www. image.le.state, ut.us/imaging/bill.asp? method= EM onclientevent&pcount
=2&pO=Buttonl&pl =onclick.
5

The Act was amended again in 2006. This exact quoted language is found in § 77-32302(2)(e) of the 2006 version.
PAGE 14 OF 22

The Utah State Legislature specifically intended to overrule this court's holding in
Burns.6 In the House Floor Debate held on February 26, 2001 Representative Curtis said
that:
"Senate Bill 154 deals with a recent Supreme Court decision that allows
defendants to utilize publicly funded expert witnesses and investigators even
though the defendant may be financially able to retain private counsel." See
House Floor Debate Audio Recording (2/26/2001), supra fn. 4.
Representative Curtis was referring to Burns. A copy of the Burns decision is in the
SB 154 Bill file and labeled as "research."7
The amended version of the Indigent Defense Act, which now extends the
requirement that the Court find a compelling reason prior to appointing a noncontracting
defense resource, was clearly intended to overrule Burns.
Through somewhat obscure logic, Davis argues that Burns decision survived passage
of SB 154. The bottom line is that the 2001 amendment of the Act made both legal counsel
and defense resources subject to the "compelling reason" standard. Davis fails to make any
argument, and cites no authority, suggesting that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to find a compelling reason it to require the County to pay for noncontracting
defense resources.
Davis also argues that Burns was "reaffirmed" by the recent State v. Barber, 2009
UT App 91, 206 P.3d 1223. In Barber, a defendant charged with child abuse was initially
represented by the LDA, later retaining private counsel. A month later, after LDA had
6

Senate and House Floor Debates Audio Recordings, supra note 2.

7

Available at: http://www. image, le. state, ut. us/imaging/Viewer. asp?Image=8.

withdrawn, private counsel sought to withdraw and the defendant desired to be reappointed
to LDA. The court refused to allow private counsel to withdraw and the case went to trial
month later. The defendant argued on appeal the court violated his 6th Amendment rights by
not allowing him, in effect, to dismiss his private attorney and return to the LDA. See
Barber, 2009 UT App 91 at ffll2-17.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that if substitute retained counsel is willing and
ethically available to assume representation, and the substitution would not unreasonably
delay the proceedings, "the defendant's choice of retained counsel must be respected." Id.,
TJ45. Even where a request is made untimely to dismiss private retained counsel in favor of a
public defender, the request should be granted upon a showing of good cause. Id., fn. 15.
In this context, Barber only refers once to Burns, noting in dicta, "Utah law
guarantees indigent defendants 'public assistance for expert witnesses' irrespective of
whether they are represented by the LDA or private counsel" (citing Burns). Barber fails to
address, however, the effect on this principle of the subsequent amendment of the Act. In
any case, Barber does not change the plain meaning of the amended Act, which is to make
requests for both noncontracting legal counsel and noncontracting defense resources subject
to the "compelling reason" test. Thus, Barber is of no aid to Davis.
IV
THE ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE A DEFENDANT TO TERMINATE HIS PRIVATE
COUNSEL IN ORDER TO SEEK COUNTY-PAID DEFENSE RESOURCES
Davis repeatedly characterizes the County's position as requiring an indigent
defendant represented by retained counsel to "fire" his attorney of choice and accept
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representation by LDA in order obtain County-paid defense resources8. This misstates the
County's position.
The Act establishes a procedure, as well as the applicable standards, for seeking an
order requiring County payment for noncontracting defense resources. Upon a defendant's
request for appointed defense counsel or resources, a trial court's first step is to determine
whether the defendant is indigent. Section 77-32-202(1) provides that the threshold
"determination of indigency or continuing indigency may be made by the court at any stage
of the proceedings." Section 77-32-202(4) then states that "[u]pon making a finding of
indigence, the court shall enter findings on the record and enter an order assigning defense
counsel to represent the defendant in the case." (Emphasis added).
As discussed above, the "defense counsel" referenced in subsection (4) must be the
county's legal defender's office, if the county has established such an office9. This mandate
is repeated in Section 77-32-306(4)10 which provides that such office shall be the "exclusive
*See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, p. 14: "Nothing in [the Act] requires a defendant to be
represented by LDA in order to have access to county funds for necessary defense
resources."
9

Section 77-32-302(2)(a): "If a county responsible for providing indigent legal defense,
including defense resources and counsel, has established a county legal defender's office
...the court shall assign to the county legal defender's office the responsibility to defend
indigent defendants within the county and provide defense resources." Similarly, Section
77-32-302(2)(b) provides: "If a county responsible for providing indigent legal defense,
including defense resources and counsel, has arranged by contract to provide those
services through a legal aid association,... the court shall assign the legal aid association
named in the contract to defend indigent defendants within the county and provide
defense resources."
10

Section 77-32-306(4): "When a county or municipality has ... created a legal defender's
office as provided [herein] to provide the legal counsel and defense resources required by
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source from which the legal defense may be provided," but creates an exception to this
general "exclusive source" rule where the court finds a "compelling reason for the
appointment of noncontracting attorneys and defense resources."
Where no "compelling reason" is offered by a defendant or found by the court,
nothing in the Act requires that a indigent defendant who has privately-retained counsel
must terminate that relationship. The Act merely requires appointment of defense counsel
upon a finding of indigency, and does not address how that appointment will affect the
defendant's relationship with his retained counsel. The Act leaves the management of the
indigent's legal defense to the indigent, his appointed counsel and his retained counsel, not
to the court. Whatever logistical issues this situation may pose to the management of the
indigent's defense, it is nonetheless fallacious to argue that the Act requires an indigent
defendant to "fire" his private counsel.
V
DAVIS' ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT "MISAPPLIED" THE
COMPELLING REASON STANDARD IMPLIES A PROCEDURAL OPTION
THAT DOES NOT EXIST UNDER THE ACT
Davis advances a position unique among these three consolidated appeals: He does
not argue that the trial court abused its discretion, based upon the evidence before it, by
refusing to find a "compelling reason" to authorize a noncontracting defense resource.
this chapter, the contracted legal aid association or attorneys ... and the county legal
defender's office are the exclusive source from which the legal defense may be provides,
unless the court finds a compelling reason for the appointment of noncontracting
attorneys and defense resources, in which case the judge shall state the compelling reason
on the record." (Emphasis added).
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Rather, Davis argues that the trial court incorrectly applied the "compelling reason" test in
the first place. Davis now asserts that he doesn't seek County funds for a "noncontracting"
defense resource. Instead, he wants the court to order the County to pay for Davis' use of
defense resources with whom LDA routinely contracts to provide defense services in cases
where LDA is also providing legal counsel11.
The problem with that argument is that the Act simply does not confer that option
upon a trial court. Nothing in the Act permits a court to circumvent the "exclusive source"
and "compelling reason" provisions by ordering the County to pay for "contracting" defense
resources regularly employed by LDA where LDA is not representing the defendant. Under
the Act, the trial court - having first found the defendant indigent - has only two options: It
may either (a) appoint LDA to represent the defendant consistent with the "exclusive
source" standard for contracting defense counsel and resources; or (b) upon a showing of a
"compelling reason," the court may authorize use of "noncontracting" defense counsel or
resources at County expense.
The Act does not afford the trial court Davis' preferred option, i.e., to order the
County to pay for Davis to utilize LDA's "contracting" defense resources, even though he is

11

See Appellant's Brief, p. 12: "Defendant does not seek county funds for his private
counsel; nor does he seek county funds to pay for a private investigator or medical expert
that he would not be entitled should an LDA appointed attorney be representing him."
Id., p. 14: "Defendant merely seeks to retain a private investigator and medical expert
LDA would have used had they been representing him." Id., p. 15: "[T]he compelling
reason standard does not apply since [Davis] is not seeking county funds for either a
noncontracting attorney or a noncontracting defense resource."
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not represented by LDA. Davis has provided no statutory or case authority suggesting that
he has a right to such an arrangement.
The "compelling reason" standard, therefore, does apply and Davis has not shown (or
even argued) that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to find a compelling
reason in this case to authorize County payment for noncontracting defense resources.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Indigent Defense Act governs the procedures and standards applicable to
the determination of indigence, and also the procedures and standards for appointment of
defense counsel and defense resources. Salt Lake County has contracted with the Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association to provide for the legal defense of indigent defendants,
including defense resources and counsel. Accordingly, under Section 77-32-306(4) of the
Act, LDA is the "exclusive source" from which indigent legal defense, including indigent
defense resources, may be provided in this case, unless, after proper notice and a hearing,
the court finds a "compelling reason" to authorize or designate a noncontracting attorney or
defense resource for the indigent defendant. In the absence of such evidentiary showing and
resulting finding of a "compelling reason" by the Court, the County is not authorized to use
taxpayer funds for such purpose and any payment by the County for such purpose would be
unlawful.
While the trial court in this case determine the defendant to be indigent, it declined to
find a compelling reason to order County payment of noncontracting defense resources.
Under the Act, the "compelling reason" inquiry is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court upon notice and hearing. The issue, then, is whether the trial court here abused its
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discretion in declining to find such a compelling reason. Davis' opening brief fails to
address this pivotal issue.
Therefore, the order of the district court denying Defendant's Motion should be
affirmed.
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